composite objects, according to this story, is not reduced to the collective activity of their parts. And so, in virtue of their whistling, composite objects are not 'reduced to', but are instead 'something more than', their parts. Moreover, it cannot possibly be vague whether the whistling occurs. Now consider a composition continuum that starts with only simples at one end, composing nothing. I say that if the whistling composites story were true, it would not be implausible that there is a sharp cut-off at some point or other in this composition continuum. And Elizabeth Barnes seems to agree. Barnes (2007) says: Merricks contends, correctly , that if we were to suppose something analogous to the 'whistling' story was in fact the case, then the argument from vagueness wouldn't get off the ground, because the cut-off in the composition continuum wouldn't be arbitrary.
1
Every story relevantly like the whistling composites story says, first, that, necessarily, a composite object is something 'over and above' it parts and, moreover, that the way in which a composite object is over and above its parts cannot be vague. I argue in 'Composition in Vagueness' that every story relevantly like the whistling composites story implies that it is not implausible that there is a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum.
Moreover, I argue that if composition is restricted, then some story or other relevantly like the whistling composites story really is true. And so I conclude that if 1 I say that it would not be implausible that there is a sharp cut-off. Barnes says that it would not be arbitrary. Moreover, Barnes (2007) composition is restricted, then it is not implausible that there is a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum. Thus one of the claims defended in 'Composition and Vagueness' is that Sider's attack on unrestricted composition-one premise of which is that it is implausible that there is a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum-fails. Barnes (2007) claims that my argument against Sider begs the question. She says:
Merricks assumes restricted composition for his argument, claiming that 'this begs no questions' (Merricks 2005, p. 627) . And this is quite correct -the key issue at hand is to ascertain what restricted composition implies, so for the sake of argument we assume that it's true. He then goes on, however, to assume that, 'it cannot possibly be vague' (Merricks 2005, p . 629) whether an object whistles. Let's call this:
(VW) It's never vague whether something whistles.
But (VW), it seems, does beg a few questions.
I disagree with Sider only about whether it is implausible that there is a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum.
2 Therefore I can beg the question against Sider only by presupposing that a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum is not implausible. (VW), however, says nothing about the implausibility of a sharp cut-off.
So (VW) does not-cannot-beg the question. The first case involves one straw on the camel's back. The next case involves two straws. And so on, until we reach the final case, in which the camel's back was broken many straws ago. Pretending that a broken back is an all-or-nothing affair, this straw continuum contains a sharp cut-off with respect to the camel's back's breaking.
5
That there is some such sharp cut-off or other is not implausible. Moreover, a sharp cut-off in the straw continuum has no implications with respect to vagueness. For example, acknowledging that there is a sharp cut-off does not commit one to (anything like) epistemicism about vagueness.
The first case involves a man with a full head of hair. In each subsequent case, the man has one hair fewer, until not a hair remains. Arguably, it is implausible that in this hair continuum there is a sharp cut-off with respect to baldness. Moreover, such a sharp cut-off would imply something controversial with respect to vagueness, perhaps even epistemicism.
It is not implausible that a trivial difference in straw leads to a non-trivial difference in the brokenness of a camel's back. But, at least arguably, it is implausible that a trivial difference in hair leads to a non-trivial difference in the baldness of a man's head. What explains this difference in plausibility?
I think that at least part of the explanation is that, when the crucial straw is added, something occurs-the breaking of the camel's back-that is altogether different from the mere addition of that final straw. Again, there is no sense in which the camel's back's breaking is somehow constituted by (or is nothing over and above or is reduced to) the addition of that final straw (cf. Merricks, 2001, pp. 124-130) . On the other hand, in the hair continuum there is-in some sense-nothing more to a man's becoming bald than his coming to have the resultant number (and distribution, etc.) of hairs.
With all this in mind, suppose that a composite object is nothing over and above its parts and how they are arranged. Then the existence of a composite object is somehow constituted by that object's parts and their arrangement. And then a composition continuum is relevantly like the hair continuum. And so Sider might be right that it is implausible that a trivial difference in the parts would lead to a nontrivial difference in the existence of a composite object.
On the other hand, suppose that the whistling composites story is true. Then a composite object is something more than its parts and how they are arranged. And then a composition continuum is relevantly like the straw continuum. And so a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum is no less plausible than a sharp cut-off in the straw continuum. That is, a sharp cut-off in a composition continuum is not implausible at all.
Of course, the whistling composites story is false. But, as already noted, I
